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This thesis investigates the influence of retiree health and
pension policies on the retirement decisions of public sector
employees. Chapter 1 documents the central role of eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance (RHI). Using
administrative records obtained from the Pennsylvania State
Employees’ Retirement System, the analysis finds that the
well-documented spike in the separation rate at the normal
retirement age almost completely disappears in the population of workers not yet eligible for subsidized RHI. A second
set of results exploits quasi-experimental variation in plan
design to show that increasing the service requirement for
subsidized RHI stretches the distribution of separations: early
separations occur earlier and late separations occur later.
Chapter 2 presents a structural analysis of the retirement
decision for the same employees. Existing models of the
retirement decision treat eligibility as a fixed characteristic of
the worker rather than one that evolves over the career. This
chapter estimates a model of life-cycle labor supply and uses
it to simulate labor supply behavior under different health
and pension policies. Changes in the eligibility requirements
for subsidized RHI induce dramatic changes in retirement
timing that would be missed in models that do not account
for an employer’s eligibility criteria.
Chapter 3 turns to the defined benefit pension plans common in the public sector. These plans create complicated
incentives in favor of continued work at some ages and in
favor of retirement at others. The strength of these incentives
depends on many factors, such as the age of initial employment and the number of years on the job. Because employees differ along these dimensions, the value of the pension
benefits earned over the course of a career varies substantially—even among employees with the same total earnings.
This chapter investigates the incentive effects and distributional consequences of four stylized plan designs. It derives
simple formulas for the accrual rate of pension wealth and
the distribution of benefits under each of the plans and uses
these formulas to gain insight into the incentives and risks
they create.

Chapter 1
Retiree Health Insurance and Job Separations:
Evidence from Pennsylvania State Employees
State governments face unfunded liabilities of more than
$600 billion arising from the retiree health benefits they have
promised to current and past employees (Pew Center on the
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States 2012). The assets currently set aside to pay for these
benefits cover only 5 percent of the accrued liability. Furthermore, struggling with reduced revenues and other spending
priorities, states are choosing not to make the contributions
necessary to fully fund their plans. In fiscal year 2010, Arizona was the only state to do so. Rather than increase taxes or
reduce spending on other programs, many states are choosing
to continue on a pay-as-you-go basis and cut future benefits.
Unlike pensions, retiree health benefits have few legal
protections and can be modified for both current workers and
retirees (Clark and Morrill 2010). For this reason, reductions
in retiree health benefits offer the possibility of substantial
short-term savings for cash-strapped state governments.
At the same time, any modifications to retiree health benefits implemented for current workers will have important
effects on the state workforce. Age and service requirements
in many plans create large financial incentives in favor of
continued work in the years immediately preceding eligibility. Completing the last year of service required can be
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to employees who
intend to retire immediately after doing so. After meeting
the eligibility requirements, workers can keep their health
coverage whether or not they remain on the job. As a result,
employees’ effective compensation rates decrease sharply.
Understanding the labor supply response to these incentives
is both interesting in its own right and critical to projecting
the financial implications of any potential changes in retiree
health benefits.
To gain insight into the effect of retiree health benefits
on labor supply behavior, this chapter analyzes the experience of Pennsylvania state employees. Pennsylvania’s retiree
health benefits come in two forms: 1) guaranteed access to
the state’s pool for all annuitants, and 2) highly subsidized
insurance policies for annuitants meeting additional age and
service criteria. In the last decade, the state has introduced
new fees, restricted plan choices, and restricted eligibility
for subsidized RHI. This analysis focuses on Pennsylvania
for two reasons. First, when the state restricted eligibility for
subsidized RHI, it grandfathered employees meeting certain
age and service criteria under the existing eligibility rules.
This grandfathering provision created exogenous variation
in plan design that can be used to understand the role of
eligibility for subsidized RHI in employee separation decisions. Second, Pennsylvania’s public records law provides
extensive access to the employment records maintained
by the state pension system, allowing for detailed analysis
of the effect of the state’s retirement benefits on employee
behavior. Though obtained for a population of Pennsylvania
employees, this chapter’s findings are relevant for a much
larger set of public sector employees. The structure of the
eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI in Pennsylvania
is typical of one of the three common forms in which retiree
health benefits are provided to public sector employees in the
United States.1
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The primary data for the analysis are drawn from the
member records of the Pennsylvania State Employees’
Retirement System (SERS) and were obtained via public
records requests. The extract contains quarterly earnings,
annual hours, and key dates in the careers of more than
200,000 individuals who worked for the state between 2000
and 2011. The period captures 115,000 separations, including
nearly 70,000 retirements. The data are rich enough to allow
for the determination of an employee’s eligibility for retiree
health and pension benefits on any date in the 12-year period
with a high degree of accuracy.
The chapter first investigates the effect of eligibility for
subsidized RHI on the separation hazard. The eligibility rules
for pension and health benefits partition the age and service
space into five distinct regions. Employees who separate in
each region are entitled to a different combination of benefits: no benefits, an early retirement pension with self-paid
health insurance, an early retirement pension with subsidized
health insurance, and so forth.2 I estimate the separation
hazard for each combination of age and service and examine
changes in the hazard at the boundaries between the age and
service regions defining eligibility for different benefits.
The striking finding of this analysis is that while the
widely documented spike in the separation hazard at the
normal retirement age is clearly present in the aggregate
data for Pennsylvania state employees, it nearly disappears
for the population that is not yet eligible for subsidized RHI
at the normal retirement age. Eligibility for subsidized RHI
at the normal retirement age during the years used in the
hazard estimation requires at least 15 years of service. For
the cohort of employees reaching normal retirement age
with exactly 15 years of service, the probability of separation increases from 4 percent in the year before eligibility
to 26 percent in the first year of eligibility.3 In contrast, for
the cohort of employees reaching the normal retirement
age with 14 years of service—and therefore ineligible for
subsidized RHI—the separation probability is essentially
unchanged. However, one year later, when this second cohort
of employees becomes eligible for subsidized RHI, it jumps
31 percentage points.
The hazard analysis also reveals the importance of eligibility for subsidized RHI in motivating early retirement.
Employees in their late 50s begin separating in meaningful
numbers only after they become eligible for subsidized RHI.
For example, the probability of separation for employees
becoming eligible for subsidized RHI at age 57 increases
from 3 percent at 56 to 15 percent at 57. Furthermore, this
increase in the hazard largely persists in the years between
eligibility for subsidized RHI and the normal retirement age.
The effect of eligibility for subsidized RHI on employees
in their late 50s found in this analysis is far larger than that
found in previous studies. However, prior work has generally
pooled all employees at firms that offer RHI, regardless of
current eligibility status, and compared them with employees
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at firms that do not offer RHI. The data for Pennsylvania
employees show that this can be quite misleading. Less than
half of the state workforce is eligible for subsidized RHI at
any age before the normal retirement age.
The chapter next turns to the analysis of a quasiexperiment arising from an increase in the service requirement for subsidized RHI. Effective July 1, 2008, the state
increased the service requirement for subsidized RHI at
or after the normal retirement age from 15 to 20 years. A
population of employees nearing eligibility was grandfathered under the existing rules, thus allowing for sharp
identification of the effect of the new eligibility rules using
discontinuity methods. The more restrictive service requirement decreased the probability that an employee on January
1, 2003, just short of the grandfathering threshold, would
separate over the next 9 years by 10 percentage points, from
73.4 percent to 63.8 percent.4
As the decision to separate is a choice of when, not if, the
object of fundamental interest is the distribution of separations over time. Using the same grandfathering variation, I
estimate the effect of the policy change on the distribution of
separations for workers exactly at the grandfathering threshold. I find that the increased service requirement stretches
the distribution of separations: early separations occur earlier
and late separations occur later. Facing a more stringent service requirement, some employees who would have worked
until eligibility before the reform decide that the benefits
are not worth the additional years of work required after
the reform. These employees separate even sooner under
the postreform eligibility rules than they would have under
the prereform rules. At the same time, other workers with
identical characteristics decide that the value of the subsidies
is large enough that the additional work required is worth
it. These employees work longer under the postreform rules
than they would have under the prereform rules. The relative
importance of these two effects depends on the age and the
binding eligibility requirement for the affected workers in
the prereform period. Older workers already eligible for a
pension respond primarily by accelerating separations while
younger workers not yet eligible for any pension benefits
show no evidence of acceleration. In all age groups, some
employees delay separations, but the number of employees
delaying separation is modest at older ages.
Finally, I adapt the hazard estimation procedure to simulate the effect of two additional restrictions in eligibility for
subsidized RHI on employee separations and on the value of
the state’s health and pension obligations. I show that a fiveyear increase in the service requirement for subsidized RHI
before the normal retirement age would reduce the present
value of obligations by nearly $500 million, or 7 percent.
However, as such a policy would encourage additional work
at exactly the ages when pension accruals are highest, I
find that it would also increase pension obligations by $100
million. That is, the increase in pension liabilities associated
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can be quite misleading. Less than half of the state workforce is eligible for subsidized RHI at
any age before the normal retirement age.
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Figure 5.1. Effect of Eligibility for Normal Retirement
With and Without Eligibility
for Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance
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Test of (pointwise) equality rejects at 5%

Figure 6.5. Employment Survival Functions
Under the Pre/Post-Reform Eligibility Rules for Sub. RHI,
Workers Age 54-59 on December 31, 2002
Projected to Exactly Meet the Grandfathering Req. in 2008
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the generosity of pension benefits may have more modest
effects. This difference in the behavioral response arises
because eligibility restrictions for health insurance typically
involve very large reductions in benefits in a small number
of years and thus a dramatic increase in the financial incentive for continued work in those years. Changes in pension
benefits tend to have a much more diffuse impact over a
much larger number of years. Of course, one could design
cuts in pension benefits that do not have this characteristic.
Crucially, the simulated retirement distributions produced
by the model capture the interactions between the state’s
retiree health and pension benefits and indicate that changes
in employee behavior in response to changes in either health
or pension benefits depend substantially on the employee’s
eligibility for the other benefit.
The key contribution of this analysis is to exploit detailed
knowledge of the institutional regime in Pennsylvania, where
different employees become eligible for subsidized RHI
at different ages, in order to estimate a structural model of
retirement behavior that can be used to simulate counterfactual retirement distributions under alternative policy regimes.
This exercise contrasts with existing structural analyses of
the effect of health insurance on retirement, which typically
assume that eligibility for retiree health benefits is a fixed
characteristic of each employer-employee pair. In addition to
the rich variation in eligibility for RHI at the individual level,
a second advantage of the current setting is the large size
of the population covered by a single institutional regime.
Because all individuals used in the analysis work under the
same regime, there is no need to map the rules of a pension
plan into a low-dimensional state space and no consequent
reduction in accuracy.
This chapter builds on an extensive literature estimating
structural models of the retirement decision. Like much of
the early work on pensions (Kotlikoff and Wise 1989; Stock
and Wise 1990), it uses data for only a single firm where the
rules are well known and can be implemented accurately in
the empirical analysis. More recent work incorporating medical expenses (French and Jones 2011; Rust and Phelan 1997)
has tended to use samples drawn from the entire population, allowing for a more general result but also forcing the
authors to abstract from important institutional detail in the
estimation for reasons of tractability and therefore sacrificing
accuracy. None of the existing structural work incorporates
data on the evolution of individual-level eligibility for RHI.5

Chapter 3
The Design of Public Sector Pension Benefits
The overwhelming majority of public sector employee
pension plans follow a traditional defined benefit structure.6
When employees retire, they receive an initial benefit equal
to the product of three pieces: 1) an accrual factor specified
12

in the plan rules, 2) some notion of average earnings, and
3) the number of years on the job. In contrast, the defined
contribution plans more common in the private sector do not
specify a level of benefits after retirement. Instead, they provide employees with a specified contribution to a retirement
account each pay period. Workers then invest these funds in
a menu of financial products determined by the plan administrator.7 When employees retire, they can use whatever
funds they have accumulated in their investment accounts to
support retirement consumption. In theory, and as suggested
by the two names, the essential difference between defined
benefit pension plans and defined contribution pension plans
is the employee’s exposure to risk in asset market returns.
In practice, however, existing defined benefit plans combine
insurance against market risk with two additional—and inessential—features: 1) a complicated set of incentives affecting
labor supply decisions, and 2) a new source of risk in the
adequacy of retirement savings arising from uncertain future
labor market outcomes.
Traditional defined benefit plan designs provide substantially larger pension benefits to those retirees whose work
histories follow particular patterns implicit in the plan provisions. By linking the level of pension benefits in retirement
to the work history in this fashion, the plans create strong
financial incentives for employees to follow these particular patterns of work and retirement. These incentives affect
numerous different decision-making margins. The decision
most frequently studied is that of a current employee considering whether and how long to remain on the job (Brown
2013; Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter 2012; Friedberg 2011;
Munnell et al. 2012a). The plans also affect the decisions to
work overtime, increase responsibilities, or pursue a promotion. Similarly, they affect whether potential new hires accept
job offers and whether former employees attempt to return to
the employer at older ages after several years elsewhere.
Whether the pension plan encourages or discourages
work at any particular age depends on numerous demographic, economic, and institutional factors, including the
age at which an employee begins working for a public sector
employer, the existence and duration of any gaps in the work
history, and the pattern of earnings growth over the career.
Because employees differ along all of these dimensions, the
incentives created by the pension plan during the career,
and the corresponding value of retirement benefits received
after the conclusion of the career, vary substantially, even for
employees with the same lifetime earnings.
By providing enhanced benefits to employees who follow
particular patterns of work and retirement and thus creating incentives for certain labor supply behavior, traditional
defined benefit plans necessarily provide reduced benefits to
those employees who do not follow the specified patterns.
Thus, the mirror image of the labor supply incentives created
by the plans is a set of risks that an employee is unable or
unwilling to follow the rewarded patterns. These risks can
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arise for reasons beyond employee control, such as poor
health events, financial shocks, government fiscal conditions, and changes in government policy. Or they may arise
from learning about preferences, consumption needs, and
other personal economic conditions that cause an employee
to desire to follow an unexpected career path. As a means of
insurance against these risks, individuals may accumulate
additional personal savings outside the pension plan. They
may also be less inclined to accept the job in the first place
because of the risk.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide simple
formulas for the work incentives and the distribution of benefits generated by four pension designs: 1) a nominal high-three
average pension with actuarial early and delayed retirement,
2) a nominal high-three average pension with percentage
reductions for early retirement, 3) an inflation-adjusted career
average pension with actuarial early retirement, and
4) an indexed career-average pension with variable accrual
factors and actuarial early and delayed retirement. The formulas develop our intuition about how and why existing policies affect labor market behavior and employee welfare, and
they also facilitate the construction of alternative designs that
preserve the defined benefit structure but allow for complete
control over the other outcomes of the plan. For example, the
financial incentive for continued employment in pension plans
using high-three formulas, which base the pension benefits
on a simple average of the three highest-earning years of the
career, depends on trend inflation rates. If trend inflation is 1
percent, the incentive for continued employment is lower than
if it is 3 percent. It is not clear why this dependence on inflation would be a desired feature of a pension plan. Similarly,
the financial incentive for an individual with 10 years of experience to remain on the job depends on whether that individual
started working for the public sector employer at age 35 or at
age 45. Most arguments for retention incentives in pension
plans suggest the use of service, not age.
A second purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear
exposition of the incentives associated with different pension
plans so that policymakers can choose to design plans with
particular incentives. A common critique of proposals to
replace existing pensions with alternatives that have more
neutral work incentives (e.g., cash balance plans) is that
such plans eliminate certain desired labor supply incentives,
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. An oft-cited goal
is to provide incentives for more experienced workers to
remain on the job. The fourth class of pension plans examined in this chapter, the indexed career-average with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustments for early and
delayed retirement, can be used to construct pension plans
that achieve the desired incentives without including the
irrelevant incentives embedded in current designs. It maintains the defined benefit nature of the pension plans while
at the same time directly controlling the work incentives
created by the plans, limiting arbitrary redistributive patterns
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across employees, and limiting incentives for individuals to
manipulate earnings and labor supply in ways that do not
advance public policy objectives.
The contribution of this analysis relative to previous
analyses is the focus on simple analytic formulas that provide a framework for thinking about incentives in the general
class of public sector defined benefit plans. As state and local
government budget pressures continue to push in the direction of pension cuts, one way of reducing the harm of such
cuts on public sector employees is to redesign the benefits
so the plans use a given quantity of resources to greater
effect. In such an environment, a general understanding of
pension design will be crucial. Existing work has derived
quantitative estimates of the pension incentives in particular
plans (Costrell and Podgursky 2009; Johnson, Steuerle, and
Quakenbush 2012); derived estimates implicitly in pursuit of
some other objective (Samwick 1998; Stock and Wise 1990);
or focused on particular channels through which the pension
plans affect behavior (Diamond et al. [2010] on final pay
plans; Munnell et al. [2012b] on vesting).

Notes
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

The three most common forms of retiree health benefits in the
public sector are 1) access to the state’s pool with generous
subsidies for the purchase of insurance if a retiree meets certain
age and service criteria, 2) access to the state’s pool with a peryear-of-service subsidy for the purchase of insurance, and
3) access to the state’s pool with little or no premium assistance. Intermediate and hybrid forms also exist.
Throughout this chapter I refer to the insurance available to all
annuitants regardless of age and service as self-paid. However, the state contributes $5 per month toward the cost of this
coverage.
To facilitate comparisons across age and service levels and
comparisons with prior work, I report annual separation probabilities rather than the instantaneous hazard.
The analysis examines the population of employees on January
1, 2003, because the increased service requirement was formalized in collective bargaining agreements beginning in 2003.
The model estimated in Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) allows
for the evolution of eligibility at the individual level, but the
authors are forced to impute the eligibility rules because the
data used in the paper do not contain the relevant information.
This work builds on previous joint work with Peter Diamond,
Alicia Munnell, and Jean-Pierre Aubry. See, for example, Diamond et al. (2010).
In addition to the traditional limited menu, plans may offer a
brokerage or mutual fund window through which employees
can purchase a much wider array of securities.
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